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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH MEIKLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, * Case No. 940576-CA 
-v-
Priority No. 15 
REVA HUNTINGTON, as 
Personal Representative * 
of BILL HUNTINGTON, Deceased. 
Defendant and Respondent. * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is vested in the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
section 78-2-2 (3) (j) (supp.,1992), which states: 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
Pursuant to the rule making power of the Utah Supreme Court 
this matter has been designated as one to be heard by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the respondent entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law? The standard of review is one of determining the 
correctness of the ruling of the trial court with respect to a 
motion for summary judgment. Apache Tank Lines v. Cheney,706 P. 
2d 217, 220 ( Utah 1993). 
2. Must the appellant assume the burden of proof to 
demonstrate negligence when the moving party provides some evidence 
which might support the affirmative defense of "sudden incapacity." 
The appropriate standard of review would require that all facts as 
established and inferences drawn therefrom could rationally support 
no other conclusion than that sought by the moving party and 
therefore the appropriate standard of review is one of correction 
of error since the Appellant challenges the application of the law 
by the trial court. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P 2 434 (Utah 1982) 
Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P 2 1332 ( Utah 1977). 
3. Sudden incapacity is an affirmative defense in any event 
and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence but if 
appellant presents any credible evidence or if there are inferences 
which might lawfully be drawn from the evidence presented, the 
motion for summary judgment must fail as a matter of law, since the 
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standard of review is whether applicable law was applied correctly 
by the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P 2 932 (Utah 1994). 
4. When the undisputed facts raise an inference of 
negligence, a motion for summary judgment, in light that inference, 
should not be granted as a matter of law, whether or not any 
evidence is marshalled to support that inference. Goodrich v. 
Blair, 646 P.2 890 (Ariz. App. 1992). 
5. Violation of a traffic law, outside of narrowly drawn 
exceptions, is deemed to be negligence per se and at the level of 
summary judgment the standard of review is that of correction of 
error. Goodrich v. Blair, (supra) 
6. With respect to a motion for summary judgment the burden 
of proof regarding the sudden incapacity defense, which as a matter 
of law resides with the appellant, does not, upon presentation of 
some evidence to support it, shift to the Appellant. Goodrich v. 
Blair, 646 P.2 890 (Ariz. App. 1982). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Interpretation of the following statues and rules will be 
determinative of the issues presented: 
(1) Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides 
that: 
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Summary judgment shall be rendered if the record demonstrates 
that: 
(c) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues 
of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences 
to be drawn from the facts, are to be construed in a 
light favorable to the party opposing the summary 
judgment. 
(2) U.S.C. 41-6-46, (1) 1953 as amended mandates that; 
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. 
Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive 
at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and 
crossing an intersection or a railroad grade crossing, 
when approaching and going around a curve, when 
approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow 
or winding roadway, and when special hazards exist with 
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions. 
(3) U.S.C. 41-6-53 (1) (a) 1953 as amended, provides in 
pertinent part that a violation occurs "[upon] failure to keep 
to the right", exceptions to the rule are given but none are 
applicable to this case. 
(4) U.S.C. 41-6-69 (l)(a) 1953 as amended 
A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left 
upon a roadway or change lanes until the movement can be 
made with reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has 
been given. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(1) This case arose as a result of an automobile collision 
from which appellant brought an action in negligence in the 
District Court for Cache County Utah; after a petition for an 
interlocutory appeal from a pretrial ruling not pertinent here was 
denied. Respondent brought a motion for summary judgment which was 
granted and appellant appeals from the order dismissing the claims 
of appellant for damages. 
(2) On October 31, 1987 the appellant and respondent, each 
driving their own motor vehicles, were involved in an automobile 
collision. 
(3) The collision occurred at a time when no special or 
adverse conditions of traffic or weather, road conditions or 
visibility were operative, 
(4) The respondent's automobile, without signaling, turned 
from its lane of travel, crossed the center line and traversed into 
the oncoming lane of traffic, colliding with the Appellant's 
automobile, which had taken appropriate evasive action. 
(5) Before he could be taken from the scene the respondent 
died. Immediately prior to the collision, Appellant Ralph Meikle 
noted that the respondent "-- [Appeared to be] asleep or something, 
laying back in his seat."(TR. P 11 L. 1-5). 
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(6) The respondent had a history of heart problems and had,at 
some remote time, undergone an open heart surgical procedure which 
involve coronary bypass, (autopsy report P.3,para.5) 
(7) Three days prior to the accident, on October 28, 1987 the 
respondent's doctor, Dr. David Beckstead, examined the respondent 
and stated by way of affidavit ( affidavit of Dr. David Beckstead 
P.2, (4) L.3), that in his opinion the "coronary disease was 
completely stable" and that the respondent was "asymptomatic." 
(8) Reva Huntington, the respondent's wife, supports the 
evidence that the respondent was asymptomatic by stating, "[that 
the respondent] did his normal chores around the house and ate a 
good lunch. After that he decided to take his car to Logan for 
service. [And that] he was current on his medications and 
suffering from no unusual conditions at the time he left the 
house." (affidavit of Reva Huntington P.l (2), L. 2-4). 
(9) The autopsy report establishes that there were "abrasions 
and broken leg bones" consistent with the theory that the 
respondent braced was for impact. [Affidavit of Dr. Timothy Woods, 
(P.l (3), L. 1-3)]; 
(10) The appellant sustained extensive injuries to his back 
and shoulders. 
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POINTS ON APPEAL 
Point I: The Respondent, on the facts of this case, is not 
entitled to Summary Judgment. 
Point II: The Appellant does not have the burden of proof with 
respect to the defense of "sudden incapacity." 
Point III: The sudden incapacity defense is an affirmative defense 
and respondent must, by marshaling all of the evidence, establish 
that the facts support no other explanation or excuse for the 
unlawful conduct of respondent save "sudden incapacity." 
ARGUMENTS 
Point I: The Respondent, on the facts of this case, is not 
entitled to Summary Judgment. 
(11) The Trial Court granted summary judgment on the 
insupportable finding that the respondent (Bill Huntington) having 
suffered a "sudden incapacity", possibly a heart attack, while 
driving his vehicle, was not negligent and therefore owed no duty 
to the appellant Ralph Meikle. The trial court viewed Bill 
Huntington's sudden incapacity as an unavoidable accident in that 
it was unforeseen and unanticipated and beyond his conscious 
control. 
7 
(12) The Appellant contends that the Respondent, as a matter 
of law, was not entitled to Summary Judgment. The Utah Supreme 
Court in WEBSTER v.SILL, 675 P. 2d 1170 (Utah 1983) observed: 
"Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered if the 
record demonstrates that: 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of 
fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to 
be drawn from the facts, are to be construed in a light 
favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment, 
(cases cited) 
(13) The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the respondent in that there are factual issues which have 
not been resolved by the proceedings had to date. In State v. 
Pena 869 P 2d 932 (1994). The Utah Court observed that; 
"For purposes of appellate review of trial court's 
determination of law "correctness" means that the 
appellate court decides matter for itself and does not 
defer in any degree to trial judge's determination of 
law. 
In the abstract, effect of a given set of facts is 
question of law and thus one on which appellate court 
owes no deference to trial courts determination. 
(14) In Pena (supra), the Supreme Court employed the following 
definition of factual issues: 
"Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing 
the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or 
conditions happening, existing or taking place, as well 
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as the subjective,such as state of mind." Pena, supra at 
P. 2d at 935 ( citing Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of 
Review- Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 
231,236 (1991) 
(15) Appellant contends that the weight given to the 
operative facts and the inferences which might be drawn on account 
of the weight assigned are not the province of the Trial Court and 
consequently, in ignoring that principle, the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the respondent. It is still 
very much an open question as to whether Bill Huntington had a 
heart attack and it is further an open question, even if he did 
have a heart attack, did that heart attack necessarily produce 
sudden incapacity? There is a further unanswered question, 
assuming there was a heart attack, did it occur prior to, during or 
after the accident? 
(16) In the autopsy report (at page 2,para. 6 and 7), there are 
notations of abrasions to Huntington's hands and the presence of 
broken leg bones which suggest, that Bill Huntington braced himself 
for impact. In an affidavit by Dr. Timothy Woods we find at, (P.l 
para. (3), L. l-3)the following, 
"Over the past three years, I have seen numerous motor 
vehicle accident victims with complicated extremity 
injuries. Fractures similar to those described in the 
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autopsy report of respondent Bill Huntington are commonly 
seen in conscious automobile trauma victims." 
(17) Inasmuch as the Respondent was the movant for summary 
judgment in this matter, the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Appellant. The Utah Supreme Court in reviewing the case of, 
Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P. 2d 614 (Utah 1985) 
observed: 
Summary judgment should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases. Williams v. Melby, 699 P. 2d 723 (Utah 
1985). Issues of negligence ordinarily present questions 
of fact to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only 
when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become 
questions of law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby 
Insurance Co. , 594 P. 2d 1332 ( Utah 1979). Likewise, 
proximate cause is usually a factual issue and in most 
circumstances will not be resolved as a matter of law. 
Uniqard Insurance Co.v. City of Laverkin, 689 P. 2d 1344 
( Utah 1984). 
(18) It has been said that the Court should use great caution 
when granting summary judgment in a negligence action, HARRIS 
v.UTAH TRANSIT AUTH.,671 P. 2d 217 (Utah 1993). The standard 
enunciated in Harris (supra) at P.220 is as follows; 
Accordingly, summary judgment is generally improper on 
the issue of negligence and only in clear-cut cases, with 
the exercise of great caution, should a court take the 
issue of negligence from the province of the jury. 
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(19) The appellant opposed summary judgment because the 
respondent had failed to meet its burden necessary to establish 
that the Respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of 
law. The questions as to whether Bill Huntington lost 
consciousness at or prior to the time of the accident and questions 
as to why Bill Huntington was unconscious if, in fact, he was, or 
if he had merely fallen "asleep or something" (TR. P. 11, L. 3-5) 
were sharply controverted as was the contention that the 
respondent, in the accident sequence, had not violated Utah Law 
(20) As stated in WYCALIS v.GUARDIAN TITLE, 780 P.2d 821,824 
(Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789,P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). The court 
held that; 
When determining if summary judgment is proper, we view 
all relevant facts, including all inferences arising from 
the facts, in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion. 
Point II: The Appellant does not have the burden of proof on the 
Respondent's "sudden incapacity defense." 
(21) In a hearing on April 12, 1994, at the trial level the 
residing judge observed; (TR. P7 L.6) 
" the issue is that we'll say this man was unconscious 
just prior to the accident. Can an unconscious man be 
guilty of negligence for violation (pause) for what 
appears to be a violation of the statute or do you have 
to prove the negligence which caused him to be 
unconscious? It seems to me that the burden of proof may 
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be upon you to say he was in that condition as a result 
of negligence." 
(22) The appellant contends that,the opinion of the Trial 
Judge notwithstanding, the burden of proof did not shift to 
Appellant with respect to the Respondent's "sudden incapacity 
defense" upon the presentment of some evidence that the Respondent 
was unconscious; certainly driving while fatigued or inattentive 
might well support a finding of negligence. 
(23) The California Court of Appeals in Ford v. Carew & 
English, 89 Cal . App. 2d 199, 200 P. 2d 828 at 831 (1949) observed: 
Appellant relies greatly on Waters v. Pacific Coast 
Dairy, Inc., supra, 55 Cal. App. 2d 789, 131 P 2d 588, 
for her contention that respondent failed to meet the 
burden placed upon them by the res ipsa doctrine. In 
that case a truck driver was on the wrong side of the 
highway when he struck the victim. This violation of the 
Vehicle Code raised an inference of negligence. The jury 
found for appellant, and on appeal the judgment was 
affirmed. Appellant here quotes the opinion in the 
Waters case as though it were authority for the 
proposition that as a matter of law respondents there 
failed to dispel the presumption of negligence. Actually 
the decision in the Waters case was that it was for the 
jury to determine whether or not the presumption had been 
dispelled, and that the jury found that it had not been 
dispelled. In that case the driver claimed that the 
accident was caused by his becoming unconscious at the 
wheel. At first he examined him immediately and for some 
time after the accident assured him his heart was all 
right. He was positive he did not go to sleep, and was 
equally positive that he had become unconscious. But the 
respondents made no explanation of what could have caused 
him to become unconscious, the burden of showing which 
the court held to be on the respondents. The court held 
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that both the question of whether the driver was telling 
the truth as to the cause of the accident and whether the 
proof of respondents as to the cause of the attack, if he 
had one, and whether such attack could have been 
anticipated, overcame the presumption raised by the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, were questions of fact for 
the jury. 
(24) The undisputed facts in the instant case established 
that the Respondent, Bill Huntington, turned onto and crossed 
opposing lanes of traffic and struck the Appellant's vehicle 
causing injury. These violations of Utah Law raise an inference of 
negligence and cast upon the Respondent the burden of proof, under 
the res ipsa doctrine, to dispel the presumption of negligence 
attaching to a finding of violation of law. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Goodrich v. Blair, 646 P.2 ed 890 
at 892 ( Ariz. App. 1982) observed: 
The sole defense to Blair's liability at trial was that 
Mr. Blair had suffered from a "sudden incapacity" and 
was, therefore, not liable for his conduct which would 
otherwise be negligent per se. Appellants contended that 
the sudden incapacity defense was taken on both sides of 
the issue, and the matter was submitted to the jury under 
the instruction in question on this appeal which we quote 
"However, the driver of an automobile is not negligent 
when he becomes suddenly stricken by an unforseen cause 
which makes him lose control of his automobile even if 
then violates a statute". For this defense to apply, you 
must find from the evidence that:(l) Mr. Blair lost 
control of his automobile because of some physical 
incapacity; and, (2) The physical incapacity, which 
caused Mr. Blair to lose control of his automobile, was 
of the kind that he should not reasonably foresee would 
occur at that time. 
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(25) The respondent is unable to apply this two pronged test 
to the case at hand because it cannot be established, as a matter 
of law, that the operator of the motor vehicle suffered some 
physical incapacity nor can it be established by the respondent 
that the physical incapacity was the kind that the operator of the 
motor vehicle should not have reasonably foreseen as likely to 
occur at the time relevant to this case. 
(26) The instant prior to impact the appellant recalled," I 
think he (respondent Bill Huntington) was either asleep or 
whatever, laying back in the seat." (TR. P.11, L. 3-5) This 
statement became a source of speculation by the respondent (and by 
the Trial Judge) (TR. P.7, L. 6) that the respondent had suffered 
a heart attack. Conversley, just prior to the accident, on October 
28,1987 the respondent was examined by his physician, Dr. David 
Beckstead and was found to be healthy and showing no indication 
that a heart attack was imminent. (affidavit of Dr. 
Beckstead P.2,(4),L.3). 
(27) Likewise, the autopsy report does not support the 
contentions of respondent. The report at page 3 para.5 states; 
No hemorrhage is seen. The chambers and valves bear the 
usual size and positional relationships with no evidence 
of out-flow obstruction. 
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(28) The death certificate concludes that the immediate cause 
of Respondent's death was from of injuries sustained in an accident 
wherein the decedent suffered multiple injuries to his torso and 
legs. The Death Certificate also noted other significant 
conditions-contributing to death, but not related to immediate 
cause given as "Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease." The 
autopsy report, therefore, cannot be construed as establishing 
heart attack, it only establishes a condition, which might relate 
to a heart attack, and explain such an attack, if one occurred. The 
autopsy report is not sworn to nor was any Affidavit in support of 
the Autopsy Report filed with the trial court. 
(29) The autopsy report, at p. 5 para 2, without foundation, 
offers the conjecture that 
"Investigation indicates that the decedent apparently 
lost consciousness prior to the accident and failed to 
take evasive action." 
Appellant can find no support in the record for this gratuitous 
afterthought. 
(30) The respondent has the burden of proof to show that the 
accident resulted from a sudden illness or attack and loss of 
consciousness and control and that such was unanticipated and 
unforeseen. Nothing in the record establishes that contention, by 
competent evidences, even as a prima facia matter. 
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(31) The issues of negligence, the origins of the physical 
incapacity, if any, and whether the alleged incapacity could have 
been foreseen are questions of fact for the jury. 
(32) Conversely it is undisputed, at this point in the 
litigation, that the Respondent, Bill Huntington, drove on the 
wrong side of the road in violation of statue and caused an 
accident resulting in injury to the Appellant. Those undisputed 
facts raise an inference that the respondent was negligent and 
indeed, those facts, establish negligence, per se; see Ford v. 
Carew and English, (supra at P 831); Wherein the nuances of the 
doctrine of negligence per se are more fully explored. 
(33) As the case of REES v.ALBERTSON, 587 P. 2d 130 points 
out; 
" questions relating to negligence and proximate 
cause are generally for the fact-trier, court or jury to 
determine. A party should not be deprived of the 
privilege of having such an adjudication on his claims 
unless it appears that even upon the facts claimed by him 
he could not establish a doubt about the matter, it 
should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go 
to trial ." 
Point III: The sudden incapacity defense is an affirmative defense 
and respondent must, by marshaling all of the evidence, establish 
that no reasonable view of the facts support any other explanation 
for the event than sudden incapacity. 
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(34) The sudden incapacity defense requires that the 
Respondent suffered some sudden and unforseen episode and it's 
rapid onset occurred while he was driving, resulting in incapacity 
which caused him to become unable to control his vehicle. These 
facts, if found, in the minds of the jury, must still negate all 
negligence and any duty owed to the appellant; in essence the jury 
must find the event to be an unavoidable accident.' 
(35) It is the appellant's contention that the Respondent 
cannot, by marshaling of the available evidence, sustain the burden 
of proof to a point where trial is not required. As in any 
affirmative defense, "sudden incapacity" must be proved by the 
proponent, and in a motion for summary judgment, proved to a 
veritable certainty. 
(36) The respondent does not enjoy, either by judicial 
decision, or as a consequence of the law with respect to the weight 
of evidence, sufficient support to establish that the Respondent 
suffered an unanticipated heart attack to the point of incapacity. 
(37) In summary, all available evidence indicated that the 
physical condition of Bill Huntington, was sound. The Respondent's 
But see cases holding that the giving of a jury instruction 
on unavoidable accident is error. 
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doctor as well as his wife provide this evidence by stating that 
Respondent manifested, just prior to the accident, no symptoms of 
illness. 
(38) Respondent presents no evidence that Mr. Huntington had 
suffered from symptoms or relevant heart problems since the time of 
his surgery nor that he was, at any pertinent juncture, 
experiencing relapse or renewal of the cardiac disease diagnosed 
and treated at a remote time in his life. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Respondent has 
failed, as a matter of law, to meet the burden necessary to enjoy 
a grant of Summary Judgment because there remain genuine issues of 
fact which should be resolved by a jury upon a trial had on the 
merits. 
l i t t e d t h i s LT^ R e s p e c t f u l l y submj day of 
A . H l ^ L a 
Attorney 
b r m e i k l e . b r f 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of November 1994, three 
true and correct copies of the forgoing Appellant Brief for Ralph 
Meikle, was sent to Linda Roth, Attorney at Law, of Roth, Nelson 
Chipman, & Quigley, 13 6 South Main Street, Suite 910, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101 by hand delivery. 
A.W. Laurit 
Attorney a 
SECTION I I 
APPENDIX 
41-6-46 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds 
at certain locations — Prima facie speed limits — 
Rulemaking — Emergency power of the gover-
nor. 
( D A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or 
highway conditions. 
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (5) and Sections 
41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful: 
(a) until January 1, 1993, 20 miles per hour when passing a school 
building or its grounds during school recess or while children are going to 
or leaving school during opening or closing hours unless a physical bar-
rier prevents access to the highway from the school building or its 
grounds; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; 
(c) 65 miles per hour on highways where this speed limit does not 
impair the ability of the state to qualify for federal highway funds; and 
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of the limits 
provided in Subsection (2) is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reason-
able or prudent and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The Transportation Commission shall make rules in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, governing size 
and location of physical barriers provided for in Subsection (2). 
(5) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change 
the speed limits on the highways of the state. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L. 
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 45; 
1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 1; 1991, ch. 44, § 1; 
1992, ch. 91, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1978 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed former § 41-6-46, 
as last amended by L. 1978, ch. 34, § 1, relat-
ing to speed regulations, and enacted present 
§ 41-6-46. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the 
former second sentence of the introductory 
paragraph of Subsection (2) as present Subsec-
tion (3), rewrote Subsection (2)(a), added Sub-
section (4), redesignated former Subsection (3) 
as present Subsection (5), and made corre-
sponding reference changes and changes in 
punctuation and style throughout the section. 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, added "until January 1, 1993" at the be-
ginning of Subsection (2)(a); added the excep-
tion at the beginning of Subsection (3); and 
made a stylistic change. 
Legislative Intent. — Laws 1987 (1st S.S.), 
ch. 1, § 2 states the legislative intent that all 
sections of the Utah highways that qualify un-
der § 41-6-46(2)(c) for the 65 miles per hour 
speed limit be posted at 65, subject to the provi-
sions of §§ 41-6-47 and 41-6-48 regarding rea-
sonable and safe speed limits. 
Cross-References. — Municipal regula-
tions, § 10-8-30. 
Reckless driving, § 41-6-45. 
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41-6-53 MOTOR VEHICLES 
ARTICLE 7 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING 
ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, 
OVERTAKING, PASSING AND 
OTHER RULES OF 
THE ROAD 
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway 
— Exceptions. 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the 
right half of the roadway, except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction under the rules governing that movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the 
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions 
of the highway within a distance constituting an immediate hazard; 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of 
traffic under the existing conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane 
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or 
edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an 
intersection or into a private road or driveway. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943, 
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 52. 
ANALYSIS 
Backing. 
Bicycle and truck. 
Effect of passing from right to center. 
"Half of the roadway" construed. 
Instructions. 
Negligence. 
Presumptions. 
Question for jury. 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Cited. 
Backing. 
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to 
right have no applicability to backing. Naisbitt 
v. Eggett, 5 Utah 2d 5, 295 P.2d 832 (1956). 
Bicycle and truck. 
The driver of a truck who was on right side 
of street and was not on, near to, or approach-
ing a crossing where both vehicles and pedes-
trians might pass either or both ways had the 
right to relax his vigilance and was not re-
quired to do more than to maintain such look-
out as would prevent his colliding or coming in 
contact with anyone on his side of street. Rich-
ards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 
P. 439 (1919). 
Effect of passing from right to center. 
While in case a street or highway is not used 
by others one may drive on any part thereof, 
yet, when a motorist or bicyclist passes from 
right to left of the center of the street, he loses 
some of his rights, and he may not be heard to 
complain of the conduct of those who are on the 
proper side of street to the same extent as 
though he also were on the proper side. Rich-
ards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 
P. 439 (1919). 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
sustained as result of collision with automobile 
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41-6-68 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-68, Moving a vehicle — Safety. 
A person may not move a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked until 
the movement may be made with reasonable safety. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 55; C. 1943, 
57-7-132; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 67. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Evidence sufficient truck onto highway, from point where truck 
In action for damages arising out of collision was parked on shoulder of highway, before 
between motorcycle and truck, evidence was such movement could be made with reasonable 
sufficient to support jury's finding that defen- safety. Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 216 
dant, in violation of this section, moved his P.2d 640 (1950). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo- C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 334. 
biles and Highway Traffic § 282. Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 173(8). 
41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes — Safety — Signals — 
Stopping or sudden decrease in speed — Signal 
flashing — Where prohibited. 
(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a road-
way or change lanes until the movement can be made with reasonable 
safety and an appropriate signal has been given. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be 
given continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the begin-
ning of the turn or change. 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle with-
out first giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immedi-
ately to the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal. 
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 41-6-70 may not be flashed 
on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to 
operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, or flashed on one side 
only of a parked vehicle except as necessary to comply with this section. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 56; C. 1943, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 24; 1978, ch. 33, § 18; 
57-7-133; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, 1987, ch. 138, § 68. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS position on the highway without signaling was 
~ i .i ,. i- contributory negligence was question for jury 
SSS^tfEE-M. safety." "-J- *»f ^ f l ^ i K S S ^ f 
Effect of infant's capacity upon statutory duty. & S t o r a * e - I n c " 4 5 1 F 2 d 3 1 9 ( 1 0 t h C , r ' 1 9 m 
Pedestrians. Determination of "reasonable safety." 
Question for jury. p a c t s m a y ^ ^ c\ear a n ( j indisputable that 
Stopping or suddenly decreasing speed.
 i t m a y ^ 8ai(j ^ a m a tter of law that turn 
^
l te
"- could not be made "with reasonable safety," 
Contributory negligence. and that defendant's act in turning was, as a 
Whether decedent's turn from an improper matter of law, the sole proximate cause of the 
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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 148 
scheduled appearance in another court on that from the date of notice of entry of such judg. 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or ment, rather than from the date of judgment 
motion days between time objection was filed Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- 124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered & Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d». 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- C i t e d i n U t a h S a n d & G r a v e l ****** CorP v 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
Time for appeal. J P W E n t e r s > Inc- v- N a e f ' 6 0 4 R 2 d m 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal ( U t a h 1979)> K a t z v- Herce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
H c ! X s . - 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f *f ^ to g*ve " o t i c e °ff a PP l i c a t l o n f d*' 
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to Ha- fault ^ ^ ^
 A
w
^
e
o
n 0
^ o
l s r e q u i r e d o n l y 
bility against defaulting defendant. 8 A.L.R.3d b? custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
>ther relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
iction as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
leemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ig and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
w JUDICIAL CODE 78-2a-2 
gerve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities 
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law. 
1990 
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971, 1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
~(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
uii) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, 
judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative sub-
poenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
Df Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
tent: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; 
and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections 
(3)(a) through (d). 
K 4 5 ) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
nting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
• the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
\ Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
\\t hv the Court of AnDeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1994 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF A P P E A L S 
1986, 1988 
Section 
78-2a-l. 
78-2a-2. 
78-2a-3. 
78-2a-4. 
78-2a-5. 
Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
— Filing fees. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. 1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January , next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
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Name: HUNTINGTON, Bill Case No. 87-1148 
described below. There is a vertically oriented 27 cm scar in the inner aspect of the 
right calf. No tattoos are seen. Examination of the feet reveals no abnormalities. 
The back, anus, and genitalia are without injuries or abnormalities. The penis is 
uncircumcised. 
EVIDENCE OF INJURY 
MULTIPLE BLUNT FORCE INJURIES: 
Examination of the face reveals multiple lacerations and abrasions. There is a small 
area of abrasion just above the left eyebrow with a small area of abrasion on the left 
upper eyelid. There is a horizontally oriented laceration measuring 7 x 2 cm with scant 
bleeding in the surrounding tissues. This is oriented over the bridge of the nose 
extending from the right cheek onto the left cheek. On the lateral right cheek are 
areas of abrasion with minimal bleeding. Examination of the chin reveals a 1 x 0.6 cm 
laceration with minimal bleeding. There are abrasions on the chin and proximal portions 
of the right jaw. Internal examination of the head reveals no evidence of significant 
subgaleal contusion, skull fracture, or internal injury to the brain or surrounding 
structures. 
External examination of the chest reveals faint irregular contusion involving central 
portions of the chest bilaterally in an area 26 x 24 cm maximally. Over the sternum and 
upper right chest are irregular areas of abrasion, some of which have a patterning 
consistent with the weave of the decedent's religious garments. Abrasions measure to 5 
x 6 cm in maximal dimensions. Internal examination of the chest reveals hemorrhage in 
the subcutaneous tissues as well as extensive rib fracturing with ribs 1 through 10 
fractured anteriorly on the right side and ribs 1 through 9 fractured anteriorly on the 
left side. Posterior rib fractures involving the right first through fifth ribs are 
present and the third left rib. There are bilateral hemothoraces with 800 cc of blood 
on the right side and 650 cc of blood on the left side. Both lungs are collapsed and 
atelectatic in appearance. Examination of the mediastinal structures reveals a complete 
transection of the aorta in the region of the posterior arch of the aorta. Examination 
of the spinal column reveals a forward displacement of the seventh cervical vertebra 
with a small amount of surrounding hemorrhage. There is a separation fracture of the 
fourth and fifth thoracic vertebra without transection of the spinal cord. There is 
however, epidural and subdural bleeding in the surrounding thoracic spinal cord. 
Examination of the abdomen externally reveals a tense and tympanic abdomen with multiple 
irregular areas of abrasion seen in the lower abdomen bilaterally and in the right upper 
quadrant. Abrasion measure to 4 x 2 cm maximally. Internal examination of the 
abdominal cavity reveals approximately 50 cc of blood within the lower pelvic region. 
There is a hepatic laceration oriented in the sagittal plane causing partial separation 
of the right and left lobes of the liver. This laceration measures 8 cm in maximal 
length and 3 cm in maximal depth. The spleen has multiple irregular lacerations 
measuring to 10 x 3 cm maximally. There is retroperitoneal bleeding in the lower 
abdomen bilaterally. Bilateral sacroiliac joint fractures are present as well as a 
fracture of the pubic ramus, just to the right of the midline. 
Examination of the upper extremities reveals extensive contusion and crepitance of the 
dorsal aspects of the hands bilaterally. A 2 cm laceration is on the posterior aspect 
of the right index finger. No underlying fractures are detected. 
The lower extremities are remarkable for fractures and lacerations. The right leg has a 
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fracture of the femur at a point 65 cm above the right heel. This is a comminuted 
fracture without perforation of the overlying skin. Examination of the right knee 
reveals a horizontally oriented 16 x 3 cm laceration. There is minimal bleeding around 
the edges of the wound. There are abrasions on the right shin measuring to 8 x 3 cm 
maximally. Examination of the left leg reveals a fracture of the femur at a point 64 cm 
above the level of the left heel. A 2 x 1 cm laceration is seen on the anterior aspect 
of the left thigh overlying the region of fracture. On the left shin is a vertically 
oriented 9 x 2 cm laceration with a vertically trailing abrasion proceding upwards to 
the knee with overall dimensions of 20 x 2 cm. Multiple irregular abrasions are seen on 
the medial aspect of the left shin measuring to 15 x 11 cm maximally. The posterior 
aspect of the left thigh has an 8 x 2 cm laceration with a surrounding area of abrasion 
10 x 9 cm. No fractures of the tibias or fibulas are detected on the lower 
extremities. 
INTERNAL EXAMINATION 
BODY CAVITIES: The body is opened by the usual thoracoabdominal, Y-shaped incision and 
the chest plate is removed. There are hemothoraces and hemoperitoneum as previously 
described. Adhesions are present in the pleural cavities between the base of the lungs 
and the diaphragm. Dense adhesions are present in the mediastinal structures with the 
pericardium adhesed to the surface of the heart. All body organs are present in normal 
and anatomical position. The subcutaneous fat layer of the abdominal wall is 3 cm thick. 
HEAD: (Central Nervous System). The brain weighs 1500 grams. The scalp is reflected. 
The calvarium of the skull is partially removed. The dura mater and falx cerebri are 
intact. There are no epidural or subdural hemorrhages present. The leptomeninges are 
thin and delicate. The cerebral hemispheres are symmetrical. The structures at the 
base of the brain, including cranial nerves and blood vessels are intact. Coronal 
sections through the cerebral hemispheres reveal no lesions. Transverse sections 
through the brain stem and cerebellum are unremarkable. Examination of the spinal cord 
reveals subdural and epidural hemorrhage as previously described in the thoracic region. 
NECK: Examination of the soft tissues of the neck, including strap muscles, thyroid 
gland and large vessels, reveal no abnormalities. The hyoid bone and larynx are intact. 
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: The heart weighs 620 grams. The pericardial surfaces have dense 
adhesions with essential elimination of the pericardial space. Examination of the 
subpericardial tissues reveals numerous coronary artery by-pass grafts in place. No 
thrombosis or other occlusion of the grafts is detected. Examination of the coronary 
arteries reveals right predominent pattern with extensive atherosclerosis with almost 
complete occlusion seen in the right and left coronary arterial systems. Sectioning of 
the myocardium reveals focal tan-gray scar tissue in the anterior left ventricular 
wall. No hemorrhage is seen. The chambers and valves bear the usual size and 
positional relationships with no evidence of out-flow obstruction. The aorta and its 
major branches arise normally and are remarkable for calcific atherosclerosis throughout 
the thoracic and abdominal aorta. There is injury as previously described. The vena 
cava and its major tributaries return to the heart in the usual distribution and are 
free of thrombi. 
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM: The lungs weigh 420 and 350 grams, right and left, respectively. 
The lungs are collapsed bilaterally. Examination of the pleural surfaces reveals 
wrinkled pleural surfaces with extensive anthracotic pigment staining bilaterally. 
There are adhesions in the inferior surfaces of the lungs bilaterally. The cut surfaces 
of the lungs have mild to moderate emphysema apically. No consolidations or other focal 
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PATHOLOGIC DIAGNOSES: 
Case No. 87-1148 
I. Multiple injuries. 
A. Multiple fractures of ribs, spinal column, sacroiliac joints, pubis, and 
femurs. 
B. Aortic transection. 
1. Bilateral hemothoraces. 
C. Multiple lacerations and abrasions of external surfaces. 
0, Hepatic splenic laceration. 
II. Atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. 
A. Status post coronary artery by-pass grafting for severe coronary artery 
atherosclerosis. 
III. Fatty metamorphosis and early cirrhosis of liver. 
OPINION: This 70-year-old white male, Bill Huntington, died as a result of multiple 
injuries received when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Contributory to the 
accident is severe atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. Investigation indicates that 
the decedent apparently lost consciousness prior to the accident and failed to take any 
evasive action. 
MANNER OF DEATH: Accident. 
Todd C. Grey, M.D. 
Assistant Medical Examiner 
TCG/pgs 
11/17/87 
4. Mr. Huntington came in for his last visit to me on 
October 28, 1987, at which time his coronary artery disease was 
completely stable and Mr. Huntington was asymptomatic. I advised 
him to continue taking his prescribed medications and return in 
two months. 
5. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Huntington had no 
reason to anticipate that he might suffer a heart attack while 
driving his vehicle. 
DATED this //Wff ^feay of *?2<LS, g^rAt^ , 1993 . 
JHTtD B. BECKSTEAD, M.D. m 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by DAVID B. BECKSTEAD, 
M.D., on this MJf' day of ^/l^ite^TiJ^i^ , 1993. 
%M/L> A 
NOTARY/ PUBLIC / I A , 
Residing in C V ^ A ^ . \LJ^Ju 
Commission Exp: ,'//0tf/?#s 
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Linda L.W. Roth, USB No. 4133 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH MEIKLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
REVA HUNTINGTON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
BILL HUNTINGTON, Deceased, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF REVA HUNTINGTON 
Civil No. 910000792 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
COMES NOW Reva Huntington, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. She is the widow of Bill Huntington. 
2. She was with him during the morning of October 31, 
1987, at which time he did normal chores around the house and ate 
a good lunch. After that, he decided to take his car to Logan 
for service. 
rr 
SHIPPED MAR t 5 ffif 
A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
610 North Main 
P. 0. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH MEIKLE, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BILL HUNTINGTON, et. aL., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
TIMOTHY W. V700DS, M.D. 
C a s e No . 9 1 0 0 0 0 7 9 2 PI 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
COUNTY OF BEXAR ) 
T i m o t h y W. Woods , M . D . , d e p o s e s and s t a t e s a s f o L l o w s : 
1. I am a p h y s i c i a n d u l y q u a l i f i e d and l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e 
m e d i c i n e i n t h e S t a t e of U t a h . 
2 . I am a s u r g e o n p r a c t i c i n g a t B rooke Army M e d i c a l 
C e n t e r , a l e v e l - o n e t rauma c e n t e r , i n San A n t o n i o , T e x a s . 
3 . Over t h e p a s t 3 y e a r s , I h a v e s e e n n u m e r o u s m o t o r 
v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t v i c t i m s w i t h c o m p l i c a t e d e x t r e m i t y i n j u r i e s . 
4 . F r a c t u r e s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e d e s c r i b e d in t h e a u t o p s y 
r e p o r t o f D e f e n d a n t B i l l H u n t i n g t o n a r e c o m m o n l y s e e n i n 
c o n s c i o u s a u t o m o b i l e t rauma v i c t i m s . 
1 me, over Mr. Meikle's signature, what if in fact he 
2 was asleep, as Mr. Meikle thought he was? (Pause-) 
3 Mr. Meikle says -- what did he say? "It looked like 
4 he was" — 
5 MR. LAURITZEN: Asleep or whatever. 
6 THE COURT: Asleep or whatever. What if he was 
7 asleep? I don't know about the slumped over part, but 
8 what if he was asleep? That's a good case for 
9 negligence. 
10 MS. ROTH: Well, Your Honor, it depends on what 
11 the circumstances were. 
12 THE COURT: I know, but that's a good starting 
13 place for arguing a case of negligence. 
14 MS. ROTH: If there was some -- it would depend 
15 on what caused that. His wife has testified in her 
16 affidavit that it was a normal morning. He got up, 
17 had breakfast. Nothing unusual. 
18 THE COURT: What time of day was it? 
19 MS. ROTH: Midday, I believe. 
20 THE COURT: One o'clock p.m. 
21 MS. ROTH: As I say, I mean, that's basically 
22 what it requires is for the jury to speculate about 
23 what the cause was, other than what's established by 
24 the medical evidence, which I think the autopsy report 
25 does establish. 
you just said and that's why I issued the memorandum 
decision. But as I looked at your withdrawal and 
started to think about this thing, the autopsy didn't 
conclude he had a heart attack, right? 
MS. ROTH: I think it did, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I got the impression that 
everything was consistent with him having a heart 
attack. Maybe I'm stating that too lightly. 
MS. ROTH: I think it says contributory to the 
accident is severe arteriosclerotic cardiovascular 
disease. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I have that. 
MS. ROTH: And that the certificate of death, 
which is issued by Dr. Gray, who is the medical 
examiner, listed as "other significant conditions 
contributing to the death but not related to the 
immediate cause given in part one," which is the 
multiple injuries, is the arteriosclerosis. 
Now, I think that one of the things that 
we kind of get side-tracked on is we're not saying he 
was dead at the time of the accident. 
THE COURT: Right. Incapacitated. 
MS. ROTH: And I don't think we need to establish 
that. I think what we have to establish is that the 
only evidence that we have is that he had a heart 
